This article studies a search model of the labor market in which firms have private information about the quality of their vacancies, they can costlessly communicate with unemployed workers before the beginning of the application process, but the content of the communication does not constitute a contractual obligation. At the end of the application process, wages are determined as the outcome of an alternating offer bargaining game. The model is used to show that vague noncontractual announcements about compensation-such as those one is likely to find in help wanted ads-can be correlated with actual wages and can partially direct the search strategy of workers.
I. Introduction
The search literature has focused on two polar descriptions of the labor market: random and directed search. In the random search model-as exemplified by McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970) -unemployed workers have no information about the idiosyncratic component of the wage offered to fill different openings. In order to learn about the wage for a particular job, an unemployed worker has to make a relationshipspecific investment; that is, he has to spend some time and money applying for that job. In the directed search model-as exemplified by Montgomery (1991) , Moen (1997) , or Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) -unemployed workers have perfect information about the different wages offered for different jobs before they decide where to look for work.
In reality, an unemployed worker does not have precise information about wages when he chooses where to apply for a job. Typically, an advertisement for a job opening contains only vague and noncontractual statements about compensation such as "great career opportunities," "competitive pay," or "wage commensurate with experience." Does this mean that random search is the relevant model of the labor market? Or could it be that these vague noncontractual statements are correlated with actual compensation and partially direct the search strategy of workers?
In order to answer this question, I study a search model of the labor market in which firms can communicate with unemployed workers before the application stage, but the content of communication is not contractually binding. More specifically, I consider an economy populated by homogeneous workers-each looking for a job-and heterogeneous firms-each trying to fill one vacancy. First, after having privately observed its productivity, each firm chooses which message to use to advertise its opening. Then, after having observed the entire distribution of help wanted ads, each worker chooses where to apply for a job. Finally, if a firm and an applicant successfully match, the terms of trade are determined as the outcome of an alternating-offer bargaining game.
The main finding of the article is that unless the labor market is either too tight or too slack, there exists an equilibrium in which noncontractual announcements about compensation are correlated with actual wages and direct the search strategy of workers. In this equilibrium, the productivity line is partitioned into a finite number of connected intervals. If the productivity of two jobs falls in the same interval, firms advertise them with the same message. If the productivity of two jobs belongs to different intervals, firms advertise them with different messages. In this equilibrium, workers apply more frequently to those jobs that are advertised with more positive messages about compensation, that is, messages that come from a more productive set of firms. Conversely, firms are more likely to fill their vacancies if they post a more positive message. When a worker and a firm successfully match, they begin to bargain over the terms of trade. At this stage, the worker's beliefs about the gains from trade are affected by the type of message used by the firm to advertise the job. And the more positive the message, the more optimistic the worker is and the higher his wage demands and, ultimately, the wage outcome.
How can noncontractual announcements be informative about wages and play a role in directing the search strategy of workers? The answer provided by this article is based on two insights. First, workers apply more frequently to those jobs that are advertised with more positive messages because they expect to meet more productive firms that, in turn, are more likely to concede to high wage demands. Second, more positive messages are posted by more productive firms because those are the only ones that are willing to face tougher wage demands at the bargaining stage in order to fill their openings with higher probability.
For a partially directed search equilibrium to exist, the labor market must be balanced. Specifically, if there are too many unemployed workers with respect to open vacancies, the incentives to signal higher productivity are not sufficiently strong to make noncontractual advertisement informative about compensation. Conversely, if there are too many job openings with respect to unemployed workers, the incentives to signal high productivity are so strong that noncontractual announcements about compensation cannot be credible. The precise location of these bounds on labor market tightness depends in a simple way on the relationship between the worker's bargaining power and the elasticity of the matching function.
Brief literature review.-In a series of influential papers, Nelson (1970 Nelson ( , 1974 argues that inherently uninformative advertisement may be useful to consumers if there happens to be a correlation between a firm's observable advertisement expenditures and the unobservable quality of its good. In turn, such correlation may exist if producers of high-quality goods have more to benefit by attracting new customers than the producers of low-quality goods, for example, because of the possibility of repeat purchases. This idea has been formalized by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) . In Bagwell and Ramey (1994) , ostensibly uninformative advertisement is useful to consumers because a store's advertisement expenditures happen to be correlated with the unobservable variety of products it carries. In turn, the correlation can be sustained in equilibrium because retail stores that sell more goods have more to benefit from attracting new customers. My article presents an alternative mechanism through which inherently uninformative advertisement may end up being useful to those who are searching the market. In my article, the cost of advertising a high-quality job takes the form of tougher wage demands at the bargaining stage. And the benefit of advertising a high-quality job takes the form of higher probability of filling the opening.
Structure of the article.-In Section II, I describe the environment and specify the equilibrium concept. In Section III, I first characterize the outcome of the bargaining game. Then I identify a simple set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which firms use N different messages to advertise their vacancies. In Section IV, I characterize the equilibrium set of the advertisement game in partial equilibrium. Finally, in Section V, I endogenize the value of search and characterize the equilibrium set of the advertisement game in general equilibrium.
II. Model

A. Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of firms with measure 1 and a continuum of workers with measure b. Each firm i has one vacant job that would produce units of output if it was filled by a worker. The y i productivity of the job is privately observed by the firm that owns it. The density of job productivities is common knowledge. I assume f(y) that the density is strictly positive over the interval , wherē f(y) [ y, y] , and I denote its cumulative distribution with . Both 0 ! y ! y p ϱ F(y) firms and workers maximize expected consumption.
The two sides of the market come together via search. At the beginning of the period, firm i privately observes the productivity of its job y i and chooses a message with which to advertise it. 
h(ϱ) p 1 for a job that has queue length l, the worker is hired with probability , where is a twice continuously differ-
, and . Denote m(l) ! 0 m(0) p m m (ϱ) p 0 with e(l) the elasticity of the job-filling probability h(l) with respect to l. I assume that e(l) is a strictly decreasing function such that e(0) p and . The reader may find it useful to interpret h(l) as 1 e(ϱ) p 0 , where is a constant return to scale function that
Ϫ1
v m (lv, v) m(u, v) tells how many matches are created when u workers seek v jobs. Then, the reader should notice that all the standard matching functions satisfy my assumptions on h(l), m(l), and e(l): specifically, the urn-ball func-1 Even though the analysis carried out in the article does not directly apply to the case in which , it is easy to generalize it and show that any equilibrium in which firms K p ϱ use infinitely many messages to advertise their job openings is the limit of a sequence of equilibria in which a finite number N of messages are used, . In this sense, N p 1, 2, … the assumption of a finite (but arbitrarily large) message space is made without loss in generality.
tion
, the telephone line function , tiation breaks down with probability . With prob-
, the negotiation continues to the next round,
where the worker gets to make a wage demand. The process continues without a deadline. I will consider the limit outcome of the bargaining game as . The reader may find it useful to interpret D r 0 the parameter D as the interval of time between two consecutive wage demands of the worker. Following this interpretation, a fraction b of the interval is spent waiting for the firm to make a counteroffer. And a fraction of the interval is spent waiting for the worker 1 Ϫ b to make his second wage demand. Moreover, while they are waiting, there is an instantaneous breakdown rate equal to one.
B. Equilibrium
Let be the probability that a firm with productivity ȳ p : [y, y] 
The urn-ball matching function owes its name to the fact that is the 1 Ϫ exp (Ϫl) probability that an urn contains at least one ball if each of nl balls is randomly placed in one of n urns, . The telephone line matching function owes its name to the fact n r ϱ that is the probability that a firm contacts a worker by dialing a number
Ϫ1
(al ϩ 1) 7 al randomly selected from a phone book that lists a measure al of workers and a measure 1 of firms. Notice that the telephone line function satisfies the logical constraint m(u, if and only if . Finally, the CES matching function owes its name v) ≤ min {u, v} a (0, 1) to the fact that it features the constant elasticity of substitution between workers
(1 ϩ j) and vacancies. Notice that the CES function satisfies the logical constraint m (u, v) ≤ if and only if the parameter j is greater than zero and a is in the interval min {u, v} between zero and one.
worker's expected payoff at the beginning of the bargaining game, given that the firm has posted the message and has a job with productivity s k y. Similarly, let be the firm's expected payoff at thē
beginning of the bargaining game, given that the job has been advertised with and has productivity y. s k Definition 1. An equilibrium is a tuple {p (y), g (y), p (y), p (y),
with the following properties:
a. Profit maximization: For all , , and whenever
and , with complementary slackness, where
e. Perfection: For all , the payoffs and
from a sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game between a worker with beliefs and a firm with productivity y. Moreover, g (y) k the sequential equilibrium satisfies the monotonicity and stationarity conditions described in Section III.A. f. Convexity of posting strategy: If and are strictly positive,
Condition a guarantees that given the queue lengths and bargaining outcomes associated with each message, a firm chooses its advertisement strategy to maximize profits.
3 Similarly, condition b guarantees that given queue lengths and bargaining outcomes, a worker chooses where to apply for a job in order to maximize its expected utility. Moreover, this condition implies that the queue of applicants that a firm expects to l j attract by posting an off-equilibrium message makes a worker indifs j ferent between searching that firm and searching elsewhere. Condition c guarantees that, whenever possible, the worker's posterior beliefs about the firm's productivity are derived from Bayes' law. Conditions d and e are self-explanatory. Finally, condition f is a technical restriction on the equilibrium strategy that guarantees that the worker's posterior beliefs are well behaved.
Three normalizations can be adopted to eliminate duplications from the equilibrium set. First, I can restrict attention to equilibria in which every message posted by a positive measure of firms is associated with different bargaining outcomes; that is, if and belong to S, then s s i j
. In fact, if and were associated with the same
outcome, there would be another equilibrium in which only is posted. s i Second, I can restrict attention to equilibria in which the messages posted in equilibrium are ordered according to the worker's expected bargaining payoff; that is, if and belong to S and i is smaller than s s i j j, then is smaller than or equal to . In fact,
one can always take an equilibrium and construct another one in which is relabeled and vice versa. For this same reason, I can also restrict s s i j attention to equilibria in which only the first N messages are used, where . N p 1, 2, … , K
III. Conditions for an Equilibrium
A. Bargaining Outcome
Consider a firm and a worker that have just entered the bargaining stage of the game. The firm has a job with productivity y and has advertised it with the message . The worker's beliefs about the productivity s S k of the job are given by the density function . Condition f in the g (y) k definition of an equilibrium guarantees that is strictly positive over
As shown by Grossman and Perry (1986) , any sequential equilibrium of this bargaining game has the following recursive structure. The worker advances a wage demand . If the job's productivity is sufficiently w t high, the demand is met and the game ends. If y is sufficiently low, the firm rejects and makes an unacceptable counteroffer (say ). w w p 0 ity condition on out-of-equilibrium conjectures, this structure implies that a firm can always signal that the job has relatively low productivity by delaying the agreement. In particular, by refusing to trade at the equilibrium wage , a firm can convince the worker that
the productivity of its job lies somewhere between and y. Using this y k observation, one can prove that cannot be greater than the wage w(y) outcome of the perfect information bargaining game between the worker and a firm with productivity y. Also, one can prove that w(y) cannot be smaller than the outcome of the perfect information game between the worker and a firm with productivity .
y k A more precise characterization of the bargaining outcomes can be obtained by restricting attention to sequential equilibria in which the firm's strategy is stationary-in the sense that history matters only through its effect on worker's beliefs-and monotonic-in the sense that the possibility of additional high-productivity firms does not lead a low-productivity firm to lower the acceptance wage. Given these conditions, Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) prove that, as the delay between offers converges to zero, all types in the interval trade instan-
taneously at the wage . Given the bounds on , it follows that w w (y) w k k is equal to the wage outcome of the perfect information game between the worker and a firm with the lowest productivity on the support of , that is, . Also, one can prove that, when a firm with prog (y)
w p by Proposition 1 (Bargaining payoffs). As , for any sequence D r 0 of equilibria satisfying the monotonicity and stationary conditions, the limits of the expected payoffs are
Proof. See Menzio (2005) .
B. Conditions for the Existence of an N-Message Equilibrium
Let be an equilibrium in which the set S has
cardinality N. In this equilibrium, the messages posted by a positive measure of firms are . Each one of these messages is {s , s , …, s } 1 2 N associated with a different bargaining outcome. And the higher the message, the higher the worker's expected payoff at the bargaining stage. Given the characterization result in proposition 1, these conditions imply that .
Conjecture that the equilibrium is such that every message s S k attracts a strictly positive queue of applicants. When this is the case, the optimal application condition implies that a worker expects the same utility U from seeking any two jobs. When the worker seeks a job advertised with a low message, he expects to be hired with high probability (because the queue of applicants is short) and to receive a low wage. When the worker seeks a job advertised with a high message, he expects to be hired with low probability (because the queue of applicants is long) and to receive a high wage. Formally, the equilibrium queue lengths are such that
The function returns the wage that a worker must expect to w(l; U ) receive in order to be willing to apply for a job whose queue length is l. I am going to refer to as the firm's labor supply curve. w(l; U ) In equilibrium, the productivity distribution of jobs advertised with the message is related to the worker's expectations about the outcome s k of the bargaining game. In particular, the expected wage is equal to w k a fraction b of the productivity of the lowest type of job that is ad-
The function returns the productivity of the lowest type of job y(l; U ) advertised with a message that attracts a queue of applicants with length l.
In equilibrium, a firm with productivity advertises its vacancy with y k the message . From the profit maximization condition, it follows that s k the benefit from posting rather than -namely,
-is greater than or equal to the cost of doing so-namely,
. Since the benefit of posting the higher mes-
sage is increasing in the firm's type and the cost is independent, all firms with productivity above strictly prefer to . However, since y s s
, none of the firms with productivity below posts
or any higher message. By combining these two observations for k p 4 From the properties of the job-finding probability , it follows immediately that Ϫ1 l h(l) the labor supply curve is strictly increasing, , and . tions (1) and (2), this indifference condition can be expressed as
In equilibrium, the market for applicants must clear. For k p 1, 2, , the total number of applications received by the firms posting … , N Ϫ 1 the message is equal to . And the total number
of applications received by the firms posting the most optimistic message is equal to . However, the total number of applicants
in the economy is equal to b. Therefore, the market-clearing condition can be written as
Conditions (3) and (4) are necessary for the existence of an N-message equilibrium. It turns out that they are also sufficient. To see why, suppose that is a strictly increasing sequence of queue lengths and U is
a value of search such that (3) and (4) are satisfied and . y(l ; U ) p y 1 Then, consider a putative equilibrium in which all firms with productivity in the interval between and post the message , one can conclude that all firms in the interval 2, … , N Ϫ 1 ( y(l ; k prefer to any other message. Therefore, the putative U ), y(l ; U )) s kϩ1 k equilibrium satisfies the first condition in definition 1. Similarly, one can verify that the putative equilibrium satisfies all the remaining conditions listed in definition 1.
5
In the following proposition, I vindicate the conjecture that all messages attract a strictly positive queue of applicants. Then, I fill in s S k the details to prove that conditions (3) and (4) are necessary and sufficient.
Proposition 2 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium). (i) In any N-message equilibrium, all messages attract some applicants and all firms make strictly positive profits. (ii) An Nmessage equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a strictly increasing sequence of queue lengths and a value of U such that conditions
(3) and (4) are satisfied and .
Proof. In the Appendix.
IV. Cheap Talk in Partial Equilibrium
In order to characterize the equilibria of the model economy, I proceed in two steps. First, I construct the equilibrium set of the cheap-talk game between firms and workers for an exogenously given value of search U. Mathematically, this means finding the queue lengths that satisfy
the indifference conditions (3) and the boundary condition y(l ; 1 for a given U, . 6 In the second step, I recognize Ϫ1 U ) p y U (0, m by) that the amount of information transmitted through the cheap talk affects the value of search, and I endogenize U. Mathematically, this means finding the equilibria of the cheap-talk game that
satisfy the market-clearing condition (4). In this section, I carry out the first part of this procedure.
A. How to Construct the Equilibrium Set
For a given value of search U, , let be an N-message
equilibrium of the cheap-talk game between firms and workers; that is, is a strictly increasing sequence that satisfies the indifference
condition (3) and the boundary condition . In this equiy(l ; U ) p y 1 5 At this point, the reader may have realized that if a tuple satisfies
conditions a-d in the definition of an equilibrium and is such that and
, then this tuple also satisfies condition f. This property does not
imply that condition f can be removed from definition 1. In fact, without condition f, the density of the worker's posterior beliefs may not satisfy the regularity conditions g (y) k required to directly apply proposition 1 and to establish that the outcome of any sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game is such that and
In any equilibrium, a job advertised with the message attracts a strictly positive queue s 1 of applicants l 1 and pays the wage . In any equilibrium, a worker expects utility U from by seeking such a job. Combining these two observations, one can conclude that the value of search U is greater than zero and smaller than . Of all the firms that advertise with the message , which ones would be s N willing to publicly disclose the productivity of their vacancies if they were given the opportunity of doing so? If a firm has a vacancy with productivity and discloses this information to the public, it y(l; U ) attracts a queue of applicants of length l, it fills the vacancy with probability h(l), and it pays the wage . The firm's expected profits by(l; U ) are . However, if the firm posts the message ,
ferential between these two alternatives is , which, with W(l; l , U ) N equations (1) and (2), can be written as
Suppose that there is a firm that owns a vacancy with productivity greater than and is indifferent between disclosing
Nϩ1 N its private information and posting the messages . Then
is an -message equilibrium of the cheap talk between firms l (N ϩ 1)
Nϩ1
and workers. In this equilibrium, all firms with productivity lower than post the same message, attract the same queue, and pay the y(l ; U ) Nϩ1 same wage as in the original N-message equilibrium. Firms with productivity higher than post the message , attract
applicants, and pay the wage . w(l ; U )
Next, suppose that all the firms that own a vacancy with productivity strictly greater than prefer posting the message y(l ; U ) y(l ; U ) Nϩ1 N rather than disclosing their private information. Then there is no s N such that is an -message equilibrium of
the cheap talk. Indeed, if workers were to believe that the message comes from the set of types , the expected wagē
would be , and there would be some firms with productivity by(l ; U )
higher than that strictly prefer to . Now, suppose that
all the firms that own a vacancy with productivity strictly y(l ; U ) Nϩ1 greater than prefer disclosing their private information to the y(l ; U ) N public. Also in this case, there is no such that is
an -message equilibrium of the cheap talk. Indeed, if workers (N ϩ 1) were to believe that the message comes from the set s (y(l ; U ),
Nϩ1 Nϩ1
, the expected wage would be , and there would be somē y)
by(l ; U )
Nϩ1
firms with productivity lower than that strictly prefer to
. Finally, if there are no N-message equilibria for which one can find s N a type that is indifferent between the two alternatives, then there are no equilibria in which or more messages are used. N ϩ 1 The previous discussion suggests a recursive approach to the characterization of the equilibrium set. Denote with the set of zeroes Z(l) of the function with the property that . The unique W(l ; l, U ) l 1 l one-message equilibrium of the cheap talk is the queue length l 1 such that . The set of -message equilibria of the cheap
talk is given by all the sequences of queue lengths such that (i)
is an N-message equilibrium and (ii) belongs to .
B. Firm's Preference Ordering
In this subsection, I characterize the firm's preference ordering over revealing its productivity y to the public and advertising its vacancy with the message for all . Then I derive the properties of s y (y(l ; U ), y)
When the productivity y is close to the boundaries of the interval , the firm's preference ordering is determined by the first (y(l ; U ), y) N derivative of the profit differential with respect to l, that
Since and , the least pro-
ductive firms in the interval strictly prefer disclosing their (y(l , U ), y) N private information when is greater than b. Conversely, when e(l ) N is smaller than b, the least productive firms strictly prefer advere(l ) N tising their vacancies with . These findings have a clear economic s N intuition. For a firm with productivity slightly higher than , the y(l , U ) N profit-maximizing wage is greater than the wage associated with the message if and only if the elasticity of the job-filling probability s e(l ) N N is greater than the worker's bargaining power b. Hence, it is natural that such a firm prefers to reveal its productivity-and, consequently, pay a higher wage-if and only if is greater than b. It is useful to e(l ) N denote with the solution to .
in the interval strictly prefer disclosing their private in-(y(l ; U ), y) N formation to the public when b is smaller than . Conversely, 1 Ϫ h(l ) N when b is greater than , the most productive firms strictly prefer 1 Ϫ h(l ) N advertising their vacancies with . These findings are easy to understand s N because for a very productive firm, the increase in revenues obtained from revealing its type is approximately equal to , whereas [1 Ϫ h(l )] 7 y N the increase in the wage bill is approximately equal to by. It is useful to denote with the solution to the equation .
The direction in which the firms' preference ordering varies as the productivity y is raised from to is determined by the second y(l ; U ) y N derivative of the profit differential with respect to l, that
When the profit differential is concave, more productive firms have a stronger preference for advertising their vacancy with the message . Conversely, when the profit y(l; U ) differential is convex, more productive firms have a stronger preference for publishing their private information. In line with basic economic intuition, equation (7) tells us that higher types have a stronger preference for when the labor supply curve is convex, that is, when it s N takes a higher and higher wage to attract one more applicant to the firm. In addition, equation (7) reminds us that the convexity of the labor supply curve is equivalent to the convexity of the inverse of the job-finding probability.
In light of these findings, I can characterize the set . First, con-Z(l ) N sider the case of a matching function with the property that the inverse of the job-finding probability is convex. If the queue of applicants attracted by the message is greater than , the set is empty. In Lemma 1 (Firm's preference ordering). Denote with the solution l L to . Denote with the solution to
is convex, is smaller than . For all , the cor-
C. Equilibrium Set
Now I am in the position to characterize the equilibrium set of the cheap-talk game between workers and firms for a given value of search U. First, suppose that the matching function is such that the inverse of the job-finding probability is convex. For all , there exists Ϫ1 U (0, m by) a unique one-message equilibrium. In this equilibrium, every firm's type posts the message and attracts a queue of applicants with length l 1 , s 1 where l 1 satisfies the boundary condition . If l 1 is greater y(l ; U ) p y 1 than and smaller than , there exists a unique two-message equilibl l R L rium as well. In this equilibrium, a firm posts the message if its pros 1 ductivity is lower than and posts the message otherwise.
The more optimistic announcement attracts a queue of applicants with length . Since is greater than , there are no equilibria of
the cheap-talk game involving three or more messages. This impossibility result has a clear economic intuition. When is convex, a three-
Ϫ1
h(l) l message equilibrium can exist only if-for a firm with productivity slightly above -the profit-maximizing wage is higher than y(l ; U ) 2 . However, a firm with productivity slightly below by(l ; U ) y(l ; U ) 2 2 must prefer to advertise its vacancy with rather than . For this to s s 1 2 be true, the firm's profit-maximizing wage must be lower than by(l ; 2 . The two conditions are not compatible. U ) Next, suppose that the matching function is such that the inverse of the job-finding probability is concave. cants. This exhausts the equilibrium set if is greater than or, z(l ) l 1 R equivalently, if l 1 is greater than . Otherwise, there exists a unique
R three-message equilibrium as well. More generally, if l 1 is greater than and smaller than , there exists a unique -message , there exists a unique N-message equilibrium
V. Cheap Talk in General Equilibrium
In the previous section, I have constructed the set of equilibria of the cheap-talk game between firms and workers for an exogenously given U,
. In this section, I use the market-clearing condition equilibrium, the aggregate demand of applicants is given by
where the boundary condition implicitly defines U as a y(l ; U ) p y 1 function of l 1 . Now, suppose that the matching function is such that the inverse of the job-finding probability is convex. For all positive values of l 1 , there is a unique one-message equilibrium of the cheap talk between firms and workers. In this equilibrium, the aggregate demand of applicants is equal to l 1 . For all values of l 1 in the interval between
and , there is a unique two-message equilibrium as well. In this equil L librium, every firm with productivity lower than demands y(z(l ); U ) 1 the same number of applicants as in the one-message equilibrium. And every firm with productivity higher than demands strictly y(z(l ); U ) 1 more applicants. Therefore, the aggregate demand is strictly
uous function that, locally, may be increasing or decreasing depending on the shape of the distribution function . For , the fraction F(y) l r l 1 R of firms posting the message becomes smaller and smaller and the s 2 queue of applicants demanded by each of them grows larger and larger. erties of the aggregate demand correspondence when is convex.
Ϫ1
h(l) l Next, suppose that the matching function is such that the inverse of the job-finding probability is concave. For all positive values of l 1 , there is a unique one-message equilibrium of the cheap talk. In this equilibrium, the aggregate demand of applicants is equal to l 1 . For
1 all values of l 1 in the interval between and , there is a
unique N-message equilibrium as well. In this equilibrium, every firm with productivity lower than demands the same queue more applicants. Therefore, the aggregate demand for applicants is strictly greater than . For ,
converges to because the informative content of the messages , converges to because fewer and
fewer firms post the most optimistic message . Figure 2b illustrates the s N properties of the aggregate demand correspondence when is
Since a general equilibrium in which firms advertise their vacancies with N informationally different messages is a point at which the aggregate supply curve b intersects the aggregate demand of applicants , the next theorem follows immediately from the previous 
. For all , there exists at least one two-message equilib- 
exists at least one N-message equilibrium, where
Theorem 1 is the article's main result. It states that as long as b lies in the interval , there exists an equilibrium in which the inherently (b, b) uninformative messages used by firms to advertise their job openings partially direct the search strategy of workers. In such an equilibrium, firms use different messages to advertise jobs with different pro-N ≥ 2 ductivity. Workers apply more frequently for jobs that are advertised with higher messages, that is, messages that are believed to originate from a more productive set of firms. And the outcome of the bargaining game between a firm and a worker is a wage that is higher the higher the message posted by the firm. If, instead, b is greater than or smaller b than , the unique equilibrium features random search. In this equilibb rium, firms use informationally equivalent messages to advertise jobs with different productivity. Workers ignore these messages and apply with the same probability for all vacancies. And the outcome of the bargaining game between a worker and a firm is independent from the message that was posted by the firm. Finally, theorem 1 relates the cutoff and to the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, it states that b b the interval contains the set of worker-to-firm ratios b such that (b, b) and have opposite signs or, equivalently, such that
From a qualitative point of view, the main implication of theorem 1 is that even though in reality most help wanted ads contain only vague and noncontractual announcements about compensation, one should not conclude that the search process is random. In fact, these announcements may be informative about the job's quality, they may affect the worker's and firm's bargaining strategies, and, in turn, they may be correlated with actual wages. From a quantitative point of view, the main implication of theorem 1 is suggesting a procedure to test whether noncontractual announcements can partially direct the worker's search strategy in a particular labor market. Specifically, with data on the duration of vacancies, the number of applications, the hiring wages, and labor productivity, it is possible to recover the deep parameters of the model and compute the cutoffs and . Then, with data on the unb b employment and the vacancy rate, it is possible to verify whether b belongs to the interval . (b, b) Perhaps the reader is concerned about the significance of these findings given that theorem 1 restricts attention to the family of matching functions with the property that the inverse of the job-finding probability is either globally convex or concave. Two remarks are in order. First, most standard matching functions belong to this family. For example, the urn-ball function is such that is globally convex. And the Ϫ1 h(l) l CES function is such that is globally concave when the parameter Ϫ1 h(l) l j is smaller than one and convex when j is greater than one. Second, even though this restriction affords a sharper characterization of the equilibrium set, it is not necessary for the existence of a partially directed search equilibrium. For example, the reader can easily verify that as long as and have opposite signs, there exists a
that sustains an informative equilibrium of F(y) the cheap talk. 
VI. Conclusions
This article has shown that ostensibly uninformative statements about compensation-such as those one typically finds in help wanted adscan be correlated with actual wages and partially direct the search strategy of workers. Intuitively, workers apply more frequently for those jobs that are advertised with more positive messages because they expect to meet more productive firms that, in turn, are more likely to concede to high wage demands. In turn, more positive messages are posted by more productive firms because those are the only ones that are willing to face tougher wage demands at the bargaining stage in order to fill their openings with higher probability. In equilibrium, all these firms make zero profits. In particular, a firm with productivity makes zero profits. If, deviating from the equilibrium, y (by , y ) k k this firm was to post the message , its expected profits would be s h(l ) 7 (y Ϫ k k , a contradiction. Therefore, it must be the case that l is equal to one, by ) 1 0 k that is, . In turn, this implies that all firms make strictly positive profits in l 1 0 1 equilibrium.
Part ii.-The necessity of conditions (3) and (4) has been proved in the text. The sufficiency of conditions (3) and (4) . Therefore, its derivative must be equal to zero for all ,
The first term in braces is the derivative of the profit differential with respect to l evaluated at . Therefore, this term is strictly negative. The second l p z(l ) N term in braces is strictly negative because is strictly greater than b and the e(l ) N job-finding probability is decreasing in l. Therefore, the function Ϫ1 l h(l) is strictly decreasing over its domain . Moreover, it is easy to verify
Part ii.-The analysis of the case in which the labor supply curve is convex is similar and is omitted for the sake of brevity. All details are available on request. QED
